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# **National Intelligence Daily**

Saturday 14 January 1984

Top Secret

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CPAS NID 84-011JX



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### **Contents**

| Syria-Lebanon: Attitude Toward Security Plan           | 1  |               |
|--|----|---------------|
| Italy-Lebanon: Plans for MNF Withdrawals               | 2  |               |
| Suriname: Political Demands                            | 3  |               |
| El Salvador: Military Developments                     | 4  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|  |    |               |
| USSR-North Korea: Reaction to P'yongyang's Proposal    | 6  |               |
| Libya-Ethiopia-Sudan: Dissidents Preparing for Attacks | 7  |               |
| Poland: Planned Price Increases                        | 8  |               |
| France-Spain: Crackdown on Basque Terrorists           | 9  |               |
| Lebanon: Increased Fighting                            | 10 |               |
| USSR: Trade Officials Executed                         | 10 |               |
| USSR-Angola: Economic Agreements Announced             | 11 |               |
| EC-US: Agricultural Trade Restrictions                 | 11 |               |
|  |    | 25X           |
| South Korea: Opposition Campaign                       | 12 |               |
| Mauritius-Libya: Libyan Office Closed                  | 13 |               |
| Sierra Leone: Growing Discontent                       | 13 |               |
| <u>-</u>   |    |               |
| Special Analysis                                       |    |               |
| Israel: Economic Turmoil                               | 14 |               |

**Top Secret** 

|   | 25X1          |
|---|---------------|
| SYRIA-LEBANON: Attitude Toward Security Plan  |               |
| Damascus probably is willing to permit the Lebanese security plan to be carried out, but its tough position on the broader issues of Lebanese national reconciliation has not changed.  | 25X1          |
|   | 25X1          |
| The US Embassy in Damascus reports, however, that Syrian leaders told British Foreign Secretary Howe that further progress on Lebanese national reconciliation will depend on the abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli troop withdrawal accord of last May. The Syrians conveyed the impression that their position on this issue is hardening.   | 25X1          |
| <b>Comment</b> : The Syrians probably believe that, if the security plan is carried out, it will facilitate a withdrawal of the Multinational Force contingents from Beirut, an important short-term goal of the Syrians. Damascus thus is likely to encourage agreement on the plan in the talks this weekend.   | 25X1          |
| Despite this tactical maneuver, however, President Assad almost certainly will stand firm on the more fundamental issues that have impeded reconciliation among Lebanon's warring factions. In particular, he also will demand the abrogation or at least the shelving of the Lebanese-Israeli accord as a precondition to a political settlement or to Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Assad probably believes that a pullout of Western forces from Beirut would strengthen his hand in pressing his demands on the Lebanese. | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |


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| ITALY-LEBANON: Plans for MNF Withdrawals   |                        |               |
| Defense Minister Spadolini says privately the from the Multinational Force may proceed more planned because of waning public interest, but | slowly than originally | 25X1          |
| change abruptly.   |                        |               |
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| Comment: The public's recent preoccupat and hints that a diplomatic breakthrough may   | be imminent have       |               |
| reduced the immediate pressure on the govern in Rome is delicate. A breakdown in the peace   | talks or a major       |               |
| incident involving any of the MNF contingents provoke renewed calls for withdrawal.  | almost certainly would | 25X1          |
| provoke renewed dans for withdrawar.   |                        | 20/(1         |

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| SURINAME: Political Demands   |                 |               |
|   |                 |               |
| No resolution of the labor crisis is in sight, and the s  | strikers are    | 25X1          |
| outting new emphasis on political demands.  |                 | 20/1          |
|   |                 |               |
| The US Embassy reports that some of the bank work<br>struck yesterday in support of bauxite and electrical wo             |                 |               |
| struck yesterday in support of bauxite and electrical wo<br>sirculating a petition calling for worker solidarity and for  |                 |               |
| of Army Commander Bouterse. This follows similar dem  | nands by        |               |
| electrical workers for the military's return to the barrack   | ks and for the  | 25X1          |
| estoration of democracy.  |                 |               |
| The Embassy says soldiers from a commando unit v  |                 |               |
| he main facility of the Suriname Power Company in Par   |                 |               |
| discontented electrical workers returned to work. Milita<br>are stationed at the Suralco plant, but there have been       |                 | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| between the soldiers and the strikers.  | no moraonto     | 25/1          |
| Demonstrators celling for Deviance or an investigation  | d 4b -          |               |
| Demonstrators calling for Bouterse's resignation sto<br>Surinamese Embassy in The Hague on Thursday, accor                |                 | 057/4         |
| Outch press, before being evicted by the police.  | ding to the     | 25X1          |
| Command. The leak of any identificable to devalve   |                 |               |
| <b>Comment:</b> The lack of any identifiable leadership o<br>he strikers makes it difficult for Bouterse to deal with the |                 |               |
| He probably still wants to avoid violence, fearing that the   |                 | 25X1          |
| could lead to widespread support for the strikers.  |                 | 20/(1         |
| The spread of the strikes and the emergence of der  | mands aimed     |               |
| at undermining the regime will put Bouterse in a difficul   | It position. He |               |
| acks a constituency outside the small military services, a  |                 | 25X1          |
| <u>afford to offer power sharing o</u> r any other major politica   | ai concession.  | 20/(1         |



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| EL SALVADOR: Military Developments  |                   |               |
|   |                   |               |
| Fighting continues in central El Salvador,  |                   | 25X1          |
|   |                   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |                   |               |
|   |                   |               |
| Elements of the government's airborne battalio  | n hegan an        |               |
| operation south of the Guazapa Volcano on Tuesday   |                   |               |
| US defense attache. Salvadoran military officers sa   |                   |               |
| continues in northern La Libertad Department  |                   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |                   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
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| The defense attache also reports the Salvadora  |                   |               |
| established a new general staff section that will be  |                   |               |
| controlling all armed forces communications. The s  | ection will focus | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| on improving communications security practices.   |                   | 2581          |
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| The establishment of the new general staff sect   |                   |               |
| step toward improving military performance. Lax c   |                   |               |
| security has long plagued the high command. It procontributed to the failure of several operations. | Duaniy ilas       | 25X1          |
| Total da to the land of our or of all operations.   |                   | 25X1          |
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
# USSR-NORTH KOREA: Reaction to P'yongyang's Proposal

| The Soviets have given favorable press coverage to the proposal North Korea made on Tuesday for talks with South Korea and the US, but they almost certainly will seek to head off any attempt to include China without the USSR.   | 25X1          |
|---|---------------|
| A TASS dispatch on Wednesday from P'yongyang on the proposal was carried the same day by <i>Izvestiya</i> under the title "An Important Initiative" and by <i>Pravda</i> on Thursday under the title "Putting Forward New Proposals." According to TASS, such "constructive dialogue" is the only road to peace and reunification in Korea in view of the current tensions "provoked by US aggressive scheming." TASS made no reference to China's role in informing the US of the proposal.  | 25X1          |
| Officials at the Soviet Foreign Ministry were relaxed about the matter on Wednesday, when they discussed Korean problems with US Embassy officers. They claimed that "the most important thing is stability on the Korean peninsula."   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| The Soviets, however, were skeptical that a dialogue is possible in the near future. As inhibiting factors, they cited the political impact of the bombing in Rangoon and South Korean reservations about the initiative.   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| Comment: The USSR has long publicly endorsed a negotiated settlement of the Korean question and would welcome talks that limited the chances for renewed hostilities and led to a reduced US military presence. In view of Moscow's own past initiatives on Asian security, its determination to play a major role in the region, and its treaty with North Korea, the Soviets probably would try to be included in any larger conference. They would be likely to object to any move to add China as a fourth party, but they might welcome expanded talks if the USSR were also included. | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |

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14 January 1984

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14 January 1984

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# LIBYA-ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: Dissidents Preparing for Attacks

| Dissident operations in southern Sudan are likely to continue, despite conciliatory gestures toward southerners by President Nimeiri.  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|--|---------------|
|  | 25X1          |
| The US Embassy in Addis Ababa reports that it has learned from a Sudanese dissident that elements associated with the group also plan attacks soon on targets in Khartoum. including the US Embassy.   | 25X1<br>25X1  |
| The US Embassy in Khartoum says the government, in a bid to ease tensions in the south, has freed four prominent southern politicians who were jailed last spring. Nimeiri also has appointed a special emissary to contact dissidents in the south and a commission to investigate southern concerns.   | 25X1          |
| Comment: Libya, Ethiopia, and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army probably hope they can take advantage of the political ferment in Sudan caused by Nimeiri's controversial measures of the last several months.   | 25X1          |
| Improved relations between Libya and Ethiopia since their high-level diplomatic exchanges late last year are resulting in stronger cooperation to undermine Nimeiri. Addis Ababa feels threatened by Khartoum's continuing support to northern Ethiopian insurgents and, with Libya, is angered by Sudanese support of US interests in the region.   | 25X1          |
| Nimeiri's gestures toward the south, together with his recent deemphasis of Islam, will reassure many Sudanese that he has resumed a more moderate course. Some southern dissidents are likely to be willing to negotiate with Khartoum. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army and the other radical factions, however, will continue their attacks. | 25X1          |

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14 January 1984

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
# POLAND: Planned Price Increases

| The regime's reduction in the size of the increases in retail food prices sets back its austerity program and reflects a continuing lack of confidence.  | 25X1         |
|--|--------------|
| The new scheme reportedly provides for increases in food prices averaging only 9 percent instead of the originally projected 15 percent. Retirees already have been granted early pension increases, and the government is considering additional compensation for them and for low-income workers. A government spokesman indicates that in the future there will be smaller but more frequent increases.   | 25X1         |
| No firm date has been set for the increases to go into effect. The Council of Ministers yesterday ordered further study of revisions proposed by government-sponsored unions.  | 25X1         |
| The authorities are taking action to show their responsiveness to public opinion. The party newspaper reported criticism of the most recent plans by representatives of the unions and promised to forward the comments to the Council of Ministers, where the decision will be made.  | 25X1<br>25X1 |
| Comment: The retreat on price increases will make it more difficult for Warsaw to persuade Western creditors that it is committed to austerity and that it has a coherent economic policy. The action also will delay an overall realignment of retail prices that will balance supply and demand. The regime now is committed to increase subsidies for food and consumer goods—already 20 percent of the budget for 1984—causing more inflation. | 25X1         |
| The authorities are likely to hope that they can improve their credibility by allowing and even encouraging a critical discussion of their policies. They also hope to show they have learned from experience not to surprise the workers with large, unexpected increases.  | 25X1         |
| Large-scale violent protests over these increases seem unlikely. The generally bad economic conditions, however, probably will cause some scattered demonstrations.  | 25X1         |

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14 January 1984

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14 January 1984

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## FRANCE-SPAIN: Crackdown on Basque Terrorists

| New French operations against Basque terrorists may lead to closer cooperation with Spain in dealing with the problem.   | 25X1          |
|--|---------------|
| French authorities are cracking down on Basque terrorists in southern France. Earlier this week police detained top leaders of the Spanish organization ETA and either expelled them from the country or moved them to northern France. They also arrested five members of the French Basque terrorist group.  | 25X1          |
| These actions follow the murders in southern France of several key ETA leaders by the obscure Antiterrorist Liberation Group.  | 25X1          |
| ne, 2177 loadoi o 2, me o 200 a lo minior e los 2120 la menos a loap.  | 25X1          |
| Comment: Although Paris has played down the significance of its actions, they may reflect a shift in the French view of the Basque problem. Paris has long been troubled by signs of growing violence and Basque radicalism in the French Basque region, and the murders by the Liberation Group—which provoked violent pro-ETA demonstrations in southern France—appear to have confirmed its fears. French authorities may be concerned that they will soon have to deal with violence among their own Basques, if they do not take action to control a potentially explosive situation. | 25X1          |
| Paris also may be indicating to Madrid that ETA can be deprived of its sanctuaries in southern France by other means than a campaign of murder.  | 25X1          |
|  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| The crackdown may provoke reprisals either by the ETA or by the French Basque terrorist group that could increase the level of violence on both sides of the Pyrenees. In the long run, however, close counterterrorist cooperation between Paris and Madrid could be the key to defeating ETA. Such a defeat would remove the most potent threat to political stability in Spain.   | 25X1          |

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| LEBANON: Increased Fighting   |  |               |
| Delays in carrying out the security plan a between the Lebanese Army and armed Mu heavy fighting continued among nearly all of Beirut area yesterday. US Marines came undarms fire in a month and directed mortar and   | slim factions. Intermittent pposing factions in the left the most intense small  | 25X1          |
| nearby Druze and Shia attackers.  |  | 25X1          |
| Comment: Opponents of the government terrorist attacks against the national conting Force in an effort to intensify demands in the they withdraw from Lebanon.  | gents of the Multinational   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|   |  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| TASS announced yesterday that two for Committee for Foreign Economic Relations I "systematically taking large bribes." One off chairman of the association that provides for electric power stations. The other was the foreign import office of the same association. The air the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet denied from the two. | had been executed for ficial was the former reign support for Soviet for sovi | 25X1          |
| Comment: The executions indicate that Andropov's campaign against corruption is of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Suprer body in capital cases of this kind. These are to be executed for corruption since Andropoleader.   | continuing. Andropov is me Soviet—the appellate the highest level officials  | 25X1          |

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leader.

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#### **USSR-ANGOLA: Economic Agreements Announced**

Agreements with Angola were signed in Moscow yesterday to develop a fishing complex employing 6,000 persons and to cooperate in constructing oil depots, producing building materials, and starting farm machinery repair workshops. The value of the projects was not disclosed. The USSR has extended about \$430 million in economic aid to Angola since 1975, but only about \$32 million is believed to have been used.

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Comment: The timing of the announcement comes on the heels of disclosure that the USSR and Cuba have agreed to provide more military aid to Angola. It suggests a coordinated effort to demonstrate firm backing for Luanda against increased pressures from Pretoria and South African-backed guerrillas. The new aid agreements do not provide for badly needed imports for the deteriorating Angolan economy or for skilled technical services to revitalize idle industries. Luanda also is making efforts to obtain economic aid in the West.

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#### **EC-US: Agricultural Trade Restrictions**

The EC Commission on Thursday proposed that the Community place tariffs on imports of corn gluten feed and other animal feed substitutes. Most of these products come from the US and now enter the EC duty free. The Commission would place a tariff only on imports exceeding 4.5 million tons, and it is willing to negotiate under GATT auspices a trade compensation arrangement with the US. The Commission argues that cheap imported substitutes aggravate the EC agricultural glut by displacing domestic grain and encouraging dairy surpluses.

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**Comment**: The EC Council probably will approve the proposals by mid-February, and GATT consultations could start by early spring. The quotas will have little immediate impact on US exports. Last year the US sold less than 4 million tons of the products to the Community, but the EC apparently believes that US sales could rise in the future. Although philosophically opposed to the Commission proposal, the UK and West Germany probably will acquiesce in return for agreements by other EC members on Common Agricultural Policy reforms.

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| SOUTH KOREA: Opposition Campaign  |  |
|   |  |
| South Korean dissidents have launched a major cabehalf of a clergyman and two professors indicted this "antistate" activity. The three had been researching the of the unification issue in school textbooks. Intelligence  | week for<br>e treatment<br>c Chief Lho   |
| behalf of a clergyman and two professors indicted this<br>"antistate" activity. The three had been researching the  | week for<br>e treatment<br>c Chief Lho   |
| behalf of a clergyman and two professors indicted this "antistate" activity. The three had been researching the of the unification issue in school textbooks. Intelligence reportedly is trying to calm the controversy by advising to mute their criticism.  Comment: The government is more than usually se the unification issue, now that North Korea has publicly talks. Dissidents appear divided over the wisdom of characteristics. | week for e treatment c Chief Lho the dissidents ensitive about proposed allenging the  |
| behalf of a clergyman and two professors indicted this "antistate" activity. The three had been researching the of the unification issue in school textbooks. Intelligence reportedly is trying to calm the controversy by advising to mute their criticism.  Comment: The government is more than usually se the unification issue, now that North Korea has publicly  | week for treatment Chief Lho the dissidents  ensitive about proposed allenging the pht to discuss ifficult, and er lissidents he |

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14 January 1984

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#### **MAURITIUS-LIBYA: Libyan Office Closed**

Prime Minister Jugnauth yesterday ordered the immediate closure of the Libyan People's Bureau in Port Louis, according to a senior Mauritian official. All Libyan diplomatic personnel, except for one official who will remain temporarily to handle administrative matters, were to depart the country within hours.

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Comment: The action follows Mauritius's reported discreet expulsion last month of a Libyan attache for activities "inappropriate to a diplomat." The Libyans have interfered extensively in Mauritian internal politics, particularly in the Muslim community. Jugnauth—who at one time sought closer relations with Libya and the USSR—became angered at reports that Tripoli and Moscow backed the major opposition party in the election last August. The expulsion order also may be an effort to gain favor with Saudi Arabia, with which Mauritius has been hoping to establish economic ties.

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#### **SIERRA LEONE: Growing Discontent**

President Stevens has closed the country's main university indefinitely, following violent student disturbances earlier this week in the capital over shortages of cooking oil and gasoline. The students regard Stevens as responsible for widespread economic hardships, and their protests coincided with the President's opening address to the national convention of Sierra Leone's sole political party. The government quickly contained looting by the few hundred participants, and no new disturbances have been reported.

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
**Comment:** Stevens's 15-year-old regime is periodically wracked by economically inspired student and labor disorders. The government is now trying to head off a threatened strike by miners for overdue pay that could lead to more violence later this month. If Stevens imposes austerity measures needed to obtain IMF assistance, public disaffection over layoffs, inflation, and shortages of essential goods is likely to increase.


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
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#### **Israel: Economic Indicators**







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14 January 1984

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## **Special Analysis**

#### **ISRAEL: Economic Turmoil**

Threats by the smaller parties to leave the coalition and growing labor unrest are severely testing Prime Minister Shamir's ability to hold his coalition together and to enact desperately needed austerity measures. Finance Minister Cohen-Orgad's austerity program is unlikely to get off the ground, however, because of the strong opposition within the government. Without an effective austerity program, Israel's balance-of-payments situation will continue to deteriorate, leading it to turn to the US for relief.

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The cabinet on 1 January set a ceiling for the annual budget beginning in April at \$1 billion below spending in the current fiscal year. After subtracting defense imports and debt servicing, each ministry would have to absorb an average cut of 9 percent in real terms to stay within the ceiling. Cohen-Orgad also is calling on the Histadrut, the large trade union organization, to agree to a decline in real wages of at least 10 percent.

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A committee made up of ministers with primarily economic and social portfolios has now decided to raise the budget ceiling, reducing required average cuts to only 7 percent in real terms. Welfare ministries would absorb smaller cuts. The committee has not yet concluded its deliberations, however, and the budget ceiling could well be raised again.

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#### **Opposition to Austerity**

The marginal adjustments to the budget have not been enough to satisfy the opposition. Members of the National Religious Party and the TAMI and Tehiya parties have threatened to leave the Likud coalition if allotments for their favorite projects are cut.

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The Tehiya party objected to reported plans to freeze settlements in the West Bank. Shamir quickly promised that there would be no freeze, although he has left the door open for lower spending levels.

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TAMI, with a low-income constituency, and the National Religious Party have threatened to join the Labor Party unless social welfare spending, including free high school education, is left intact. The US Embassy reports that TAMI has begun discussions with Labor leaders.

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Top Secret

14 January 1984

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| An estimated 40,000 government workers—10 percer sector employees—are now involved in strikes and slowded demonstrate their opposition to the current annual inflation 200 percent and to Cohen-Orgad's call for large cuts in resulting the strikes are likely because workers fear budget cuts fewer jobs.                                       | owns to<br>on rate of<br>eal wages.           | 25X1          |
| On 1 January the cabinet also authorized Cohen-Organegotiate a package deal on wages, prices, and taxes with Histadrut and the Manufacturers' Association. Union officithe idea. They believe that differences between the governthe Histadrut are too great to resolve and that the governtrying to put the burden of economic retrenchment on wa | n the<br>als rejected<br>nment and<br>ment is | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
| Outlook  |   |               |
| Cohen-Orgad's austerity program is unlikely to be put Even after the ministerial committee makes its recommen full cabinet still has to approve the budget, giving minister opportunity to increase their funding. Although Shamir ap back the cuts, he probably would do an about-face if he was persuaded his government would topple.           | dations, the<br>rs another<br>pears to        | 25X1          |
| Even if budget cuts are adopted, experience suggests will probably not be implemented. Israeli ministers are no responsible for budgetary mismanagement. As a result, the outlays can easily exceed their budget limits.   | t held  | 25X1          |
| The Histadrut has little incentive to reach an accomm with Cohen-Orgad. It supports the Labor Party, which bel faltering economy may soon bring Shamir down.   |   | 25X1          |
| Officials of Histadrut probably calculate that they could better deal from Labor. They believe that they could not so Orgad's proposals to their members and that they have noted by taking a tough stand.   | sell Cohen-                                   | 25X1          |
| If Cohen-Orgad somehow overcomes these obstacles his austerity program in place, the resulting economic slowould cause unemployment that would quickly put an encexperiment. One of the basic tenets of Israeli policy has a that significant unemployment is unacceptable because obligation to provide jobs for Jews coming to Israel.           | wdown<br>d to the<br>llways been              | 25X1          |
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| Israeli officials say that an unemployment rate above would force them to adopt expansionary policies. Unempstands at 4 percent.   | e 7 percent<br>ployment now                        | 25X1          |
| Cohen-Orgad is pushing his austerity program in ord<br>domestic demand and thereby free more production for<br>addition, the demand for imports would be curbed, which<br>help reduce Israel's foreign trade deficit.  | exports. In  | 25X1          |
| Since Cohen-Orgad is unlikely to succeed, Israel's b payments situation will continue to deteriorate. Unless T manages to secure substantially more foreign financial bis likely to be available from commercial lenders, the cou a foreign exchange crisis. Israeli officials, finding it politicals. | el Aviv<br>eacking than<br>ntry will have<br>cally |               |
| unpalatable to attempt a program requiring economic sa   | crifice by the                                     | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |

14 January 1984

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